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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 











CASE NO. 18202 
STATEMENT ·oF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The nature of this case is a dispute over the terms of 
an oral agreement to convey land, with ap.pellants seeking to 
rescind the agreement because of the failure of respondent to 
comply with the terms of the agreement. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
In February of 1981 appellants filed an amended complaint 
against respondent seeking the recovery of amounts paid under an 
oral contract to convey land. This complaint sought recovery under 
four causes of action. First, that respondent breached the con-
tract; second, that the oral contract is unenforceable and subject 
to rescission because it falls within the statute of frauds; 
third, that respondent has been unjustly enriched; and fourth, 
that appellants were induced to enter the sales agreement through 
fraudulent statements and misrepresentations. 
After a non-jury triai the Court ·held that appellants 
did not carry their burden of proof in establishing that one of the 
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terms of the agreement was an enforceable commitment of respondent 
to provide construction financing to appellants; that the oral 
agreement was removed from the statute of frauds by part perform-
ance; that appellants failed to prove by clear and convincing 
proof that respondent made a fraudulent representation; and 
that respondent is entitled to a foreclosure. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants respectfully request this Court to reverse 
the Trial Court's decision and award appellants rescission of 
the agreement and restitution. 
PREFATORY 'NOTE 
Upon counsel's request, the court reporter transcribed 
the trial record into the official trial transcript. However, 
counsel 1 s closing arguments were not transcribed at that time. 
Upon further request of counsel the portion of the record con-
taining the closing arguments was transcribed and made a part of 
the record on appeal. The page numbering in this supplemental 
portion of the transcript begins with number one. Therefore, 
in order to di.stinguish it from the main portion of the trial 
transcript~ the supplemental portion will be identified as 
"Tr. 2d". 
STATEMENT OF 'THE FACTS 
In April of 1978 the appellants~ Carl Baldwin and Larry 
Gleim, met with an employee of the defendant, Vantage Corporation 
(hereinafter referred to as Vantage) to discuss the purchase of 
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building lots from Vantage (Tr. pp. 10, 59). The employee of 
Vantage with whom the appellants met was Doug Boulton (Tr. pp. 11, 
59). The appellants, as licensed general contractors wanted to 
purchase a number of building lots located in a newly developed 
Utah County Subdiv~sion known as Blackhawk Estates Subdivision 
(Tr. pp. 9, 10, 60, 77). At that time Vantage owned about 62 
lots in Plat "D" of this subdivision (Tr. pp. 78). 
During the month of April, 1978, the parties met on three 
separate occasions and as a· result of these meetings, appellants 
agreed to purchase from Vantage SEVEN (7) particular building lots 
in Plat 11Du of Blackhawk Estates Subdivision (Tr. pp. 14 and 43). 
These SEVEN _{7) lots are numbers, 18, 19, 28, 34, 35, 49 and 58 
(Tr. p .. 43) ~ This agreement was made orally and no contracts of 
sale or any other memoranda were signed by appellants (Tr. pp .. 15, 
17, and 7.3). No written sales contracts, earnest money agreements, 
trust deed notes, trust deeds or similar documents were produced at 
trial {Tr. PPo 1 - 124). 
The terms of the sales agreement were discussed and agreed 
upon during the three meetings in Apr~l of 1978. When the appellants 
first met with Doug Boulton, they met in a Deseret Federal Savings 
and Loan (hereinafter referred to as Deseret Federal) office 
located in Orem, Utah (Tr~ pp. 11, 59). The persons present at 
this first meeting were Larry ~leim~ Carl Baldwin, Doug Boulton 
and Gary Mayo {Tr. pp. 11, 59, 84)~ Mr~ Mayo was an employee of 
Deseret Federal and he introduced appellants to Doug Boulton 
{Tr. p. 84). The second meeting in April of 1978 took place in 
Doug Boulton's office, which is located in one of Deseret Federal's 
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offices in Salt Lake City. The persons present at this time 
were Carl Baldwin, Larry Gleim and Doug Boulton (Tr. pp. 14, 59). 
The third time the parties met the peo'ple present were Larry Gleim 
and Doug Boulton and again they met in Doug Boulton's office in 
Salt Lake City ('Tr . .p. 61) .. All three of the principal parties to 
the agreement, Larry Gleim, Carl Baldwin and Doug Boulton, appeared 
at trial and testifi.ed as to the terms of the agreement. 
Both appellants testified that one of the fundamental 
terms of the agreement was that construction loans and long term 
financing would be provided by Deseret Federal~ Specifically, 
Doug Boulton guaranteed that Deseret Federal would provide the 
construction financing for homes built on the lots if~ appellants 
purchased the lots (Tr. pp .. 12, 13., 14, 51, 24, 37, 38, 59, 60, 63, 
65, 66, 67, 69, and 70)~ This guarantee was a fundamental term 
of the oral agreement and without it, appellants would not have 
entered the contracts to purchase the lots (Tr. pp. 24, 65). All 
of the testimony concerning this aspect of the agreement will be 
discussed in the argument portion of this brief under issue number 
one. Lt is sufficient here to state that the testimony of Doug 
Boulton indi.cates he does not remember specifically tbE! statements 
which he made to appellants in April of 1978. Most of the other 
terms of the agreement are not di.sputed .. 
When the parties concluded the contract negotiations, 
appellants paid Vantage the sum of $8, 950. 00 as the down payment on 
all SEVEN (7) lots (Tr. p. 61).. This amount represents TEN PERCENT 
(10%) of the purchase price for each lot. Lots 18, 19, and 28 had 
a purchase.price of $13,500.00 each and lots 34, 35, 49 and 58 had 
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a purchase price of $12,500.00 each (Tr. p. 43) (See also 
defendant's Exhibit 5). 
The amount of interest accruing on the unpaid balance 
of the purchase price for each lot is not disputed. The parties 
agreed that interst on the unpaid balance would start accruing 
at ELEVEN PERCENT (11%) per annum, from the time power was avail-
able to each lot. This interest rate of ELEVEN PERCENT (11%) was 
to increase to THIRTEEN PERCENT {13%) per annum after one year 
(Tr. pp. 5, 9, 12, 103, 104)~ 
Some time after the down payment was made, appellants 
began receiving monthly statements requiring the payment of the 
accrued interest on the balance of purchase price. Appellants 
testified that the original agreement did not require them to · 
p~y the interest monthly~ Rather, this interest was to be paid 
upon the sale of each home constructed on the lot (Tr .. pp. 17, 18, 
19, 62). However, in January of 1979, and at the request of Van-
tage, appellants paid Vantage the sum of $4,278.,59. This amount 
paid all of the accrued interest o.n each of the SEVEN ( 7) lots 
through January 31, 1979 {TR. pp. 100, 101) (See also defendant's 
Exhibit number 5 and plaintiff 1 s Exhibit number 2). Later in 1979, 
and at the request of Vantage,, appellants again paid the accrued 
intere.st on each lot {Tr. pp ... 20 ,. 103). This payment, made in 
June of 1979 and in the amount of $2,990.32, paid the accrued 
interest through May 3'1, 197.9 {See also plaintiffs f Exhibit 3 
and defendant's Exhibit 5). 
Appellants chose not to build houses on three of the 
lots and in the later part of 1979, sold Lots 28, 49 and 58 to 
third parties {Tr.. pp.. 21, 22) .. Upon the sale of each of these 
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lots the balance of the purchase price, together with the accrued 
interest was fully paid (Tr. pp. 21, 22) (See also defendant's 
Exhibit 5). Also upon the sale of each of these lots the 
documents necessary to clear title to the purchasers were executed 
(Tr. pp. 22, 91, 92). As to the remaining FOUR (4) lots, numbers 
18, 19, 34 and 35, the appellants did not sign any written contract 
or other documents or memoranda (Tr. pp. 15, 17, 23, 73). 
In February of 1980 appellants went to the Orem off ice of 
Deseret Federal and met with a loan officer named LaRae Pittman. 
At that time appellants inquired about obtaining construction loans 
to build homes on Lots 34 and 35 (Tr. pp. 24, 63). In response to 
this appellants were denied a loan application and were told that 
Deseret Federal was not offering construction loans for homes 
built on speculation (Tr. P~ 24). Appellants then explained to 
the loan officer that construction loans were guaranteed to them, 
under a previous arrangement with Doug Boulton (Tr. pp. 25, 63). 
The loan officer then called Mr. Preben Nielsen, a senior vice-
presi.dent and manager of Vantage (Tr. pp. 111, 112). Mr. Nielsen 
indicated that he would speak with the person in charge of mort-
gage lending and find out what the situation was with regards to 
construction financing .(Tr. pp. 25, 117). Appellants then left 
the Deseret Federal office .. 
Following this incident in February of 1980; appellants 
contacted Deseret Fedearl on several occasions to make further 
inquiry about obtaining construction financing (Tr. pp. 26, 27, 63) 
These communications culminated in the summer of 1980 with a person 
meeting between appellants and two representatives of Deseret 
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Federal. This meeting was held in Mr. Preben Nielsen's office 
in Salt Lake City (Tr. p. 116). The persons present at this 
meeting were Carl Baldwin, Larry Gleim, Preben Nielsen and John 
Cecil. Mr. Cecil is an accountant for Deseret Federal (Tr. p. 97). 
The substance of the discussion at the meeting is that appellants 
were informed that it was not possible for Deseret Federal to 
extend construction loans to them~ In response to this, appellants 
requested that Vantage return to them the down payment and interest 
which they paid on Lots 18, 19, 34 and 35. This request was 
denied. Other possible arrangements were discussed but they 
were not acceptable to appellants {Tr. pp. 2, 64, 110, 115, and 
116). 
Following this meeting, appellants contacted an attorney, 
Mr. Ray M. Harding, Jr. 1 and requested him to try and obtain a 
rescission of the sales contracts on the lots and to get their 
money back {Tr. pp. 29, 64) •. In December of 1980 appellants filed 
a complaint against Vantage seeking rescission of the Sales con-
tracts for Lots 18, 19, 34, and 35 and restitution .. 
. ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE.COURT.ABUSED 'ITS DISCRETION 'IN.FINDING .. THAT 
mr-:-GUARANTEE ·oF CONSTRUCTION .FINANCING WAS 'MADE-.. 
A. Scope ·of ·Review 
Article VIII, Section 9, of the Constitution of Utah 
states that an appeal to the Supreme Court may be on questions 
of both law and fact in equi.ty cases, 
In the present case, appellants' amended complaint 
specifically prays for resci.ssion and restitution. This case is 
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therefore an equitable action and as such the Supreme Court may 
review the facts as well as the law. Upon a review of the facts, 
this court may make new findings of fact when the evidence so 
clearly preponderates against the trial court's findings that a 
manifest injustice has been done. Hatch v. Bastion, 567 P 2d 1100 
(Utah, 1977), Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P 2d 811 
(1972). It is appellant's position that a review of the facts will 
establish that a manifest injustice has been done, requiring a 
reversal of the lower court's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. 
Bo Evidence establishing guararttee. 
As noted in the statement of facts there were only three 
people who were involved in the contract negotiations which 
resulted in the agreement whereby appellants agreed to purchase 
SEVEN (7) lots from Vantage. These three people are the appellants 
Carl Baldwin and Larry Gleim, and a representative of Vantage and 
Deseret Federal, Doug Boulton.. All three of these people appeared 
at trial and testified about the contract negotiations, including 
the guarantee of Construction financing. Therefore~ the evidence 
which establi.shes whether the guarantee was made must come from 
the testimony of appellants and Doug Boulton. Appellants maintain 
that the testimony of these three witnessess, taken together, 
establishes with certainty that a guarantee of construction finan-
cing was made to appellants. 
In an effort to avoid any mis-statement of the evidence, 
and in support of their position, appellants submit the follow~ng 
excerpts from the trial transcript: 
/ 
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On direct examination, Carl Baldwin testified as follows: 
Page 12, lines 2-16, 
Q. (By Mr. Harding) In this conversation that you 
had, was any discussion had of guarantees? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And can you tell me specifically what was said 
and by whom in regards to guarantees? 
A. We asked that if we could purchase these lots, that 
loans would be guaranteed through Deseret Federal. It was answered 
that ye~ they would be. 
Q. Who gave that answer_? 
A. Doug Boulton. 
Q. This was in the~ first meeting that you had? 
A. Yes. They reason why we asked the question was 
that if we went to any other bank besides Deseret Federal, the 
loans would have to be paid off and that there would be no sub-
ordination. 
Page 13, lines 4 through 7. 
Q. Okay. As you were answering or contemplating the 
purchase of these lots, wh.tii.kth of these terms that proposed to you 
were the most important to you? 
A. That we were guaranteed a loan, 
Page 14, lines 10-18 and 23-30 
Q. What, specifically, what was said, though, in regard 
to the terms, and who by? 
A. At that time I remember saying to Doug, "Is our loans 
guaranteed for sure_? Because. if they are not, then we'd have to 
go to other financing and those lots would have to be paid off 
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in full." He said, "Yes". He says that Deseret Federal, the 
reason why they were doing this was that they wanted the con-
struction money to go through them and also the long-term finan-
cing, if possible. 
Lines 23 through 30 
Q. Onee ~gai~what particulars in regards to sub-
ordination were discussed at this meeting? 
A. Well, the subordination was that, as I mentioned, 
that De.seret Federal, as I asked the question, "Are you sure that 
Deseret Federal would make those loans? Is that guaranteed? 
Doug said, "Yes". And I mentioned that that was the purpose, 
because if it wasn't then we would have to go somewhere else 
and we'd have to pay off the lots. 
Page 23 lines 29-30 and page 24, lines 1-9 
Q. (By Mr. Harding) What statements of Mr. Boult0n 
did. you rely upon in making the purchase? 
THE COURT: If any. 
Q. {By Mr. Harding) - - If any? 
MR. GARRETT: I'm also going to object to it being 
repetitious, he's covered this ground, your Honor. 
THE COURT: He may answer. 
A. The thing that was so important to us was the guarante 
of loan, the subordination and the reasonable interest .. 
On cross examination, Mr. Baldwin testified as follows: 
Page 37, lines 21-29 
Q. All right. Isn't it a fact that when you went to 
Mr. Boulton about the purchase of lots and discussed financing, 
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all he ever really said to you was that Deseret Federal or Vantage 
would like the construction loan and the permanent financing, 
if it were possible; wasn't that what he said to you? 
A. No, that's not what. he said to me. 
Q. Is that a possibility that that's what he said: 
A. No, that is not a possiblity, because we made . 
Page 38, lines 6 - 12 
A. Yes. In the conversation Lhat we had with Doug 
Boultcin, I asked specifically if that money was guaranteed. 
Q. Well, did you mean that it would be guaranteed to 
you under all conditions.1 
A. It was never di.scussed. We went out there with 
the feeling thc:.t if we wanted to build a home, that that financing 
was available. 
On Direct Examination, appellant Larry Gleim testified as 
follows: 
Page 59, ones 12-16 
A. . .. .. We discussed tli"a-t Deseret Federal' s position 
as lending institution, and we were told at that time that we 
would be granted or guaranteed construction loans on those lots. 
Q. Who told you this.1 
A. Doug Boultona 
Page 60, lines 16-25 
Q~ Did you rely upon any of the statements of Doug 
Boulton in these two meetings and consumating the sale or in 
agreeing to purchase these lots2 
A. Totally .. 
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Q. Which of the terms were important to you in deciding 
to purchase the lots? 
A. The low down payment of ten percent was appealing, 
and that they would guarantee us a construction loan when we were 
ready to build homes on those lots, and they would subordinate the 
homes that we would build. 
Page 65, lines 10-13 
Q. Would you have agreed to purchase the lots from 
Vantage Corporation had they not guaranteed construction financing? 
A. No, not with the materials thE!Y had. 
On cross examination Mr. Gleim testified as follows~ 
Page 66, lines 19-30 and page 67, l~ne 1 
Q. Mr. Gleim, you testified generally concerning some 
conversations· you had with Mr. Boulton concerning a guarantee, 
you used the word "guarantee," is. that correct? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did Mr. Boulton use the word "guarantee"? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. And his statement to you then is that he 
guarantee construction loan financing, is that right1 
A. That's correct. 
would 
Q. And he meant by that, to your knowledge, that you 
could go in and get that loan any time· you wanted in the future, 
is that right? 
A. That's right. 
These excerpts illustrate the clarity of appellants 
testimony. Both Carl Baldwin and Larry Gleim remember the c~ntract 
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negotiations in detail and were able to explain their position 
and expectations clearly under direct and cross examination. 
In addition, there is nothing in the testimony of either 
appellant which suggests inconsistency or unreirabiliity. Therefore, 
any evidence upon which the trial court could have based its 
finding that Vantage did not make a guarantee of construction 
financing, must be found in the testimony of other witnesses. 
The only other party to the contract negotiations is 
Doug Boulton. Mr. Boulton testified as one of appellants witnesses 
and his testimony indicates that he remembers very little about 
specific statements that were made. However, many of hJis statements 
support the testimony of Carl Baldwin and Larry Gleim. Appellants 
call particular attention to the following excerpts from Mr. Boulton 1 s 
testimony: 
On direct examination Mr. Boulton testified as follows: 
Page 78, lines 20-30, and page 79, lines 1-2 
Q. Do you recall whether or not you actually said, 
"I guarantee construction financing"? Do you recall your words 
in the conversation so that you know whether or not you said that? 
A.. I--you've got to remember this has been a couple of 
years ago, and I can't recall of saying it, just to be honest. 
Q ... Okay.. Do you recall not saying it? 
A. It's--We used to have a lot of these for, I don 1 t 
mean to say from your question, but we used to of course offer this 
to builders if they met the requirements and done the buildling 
in a timely manner. But I, it's hard for--
On cross examination, Mr .. Boulton testified as follows:. 
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Page 86, lines 8-17 
Q. Now it's important here, Mr. Boulton, when we 
talk about this matter of construction loan: I believe you 
indicated that you do not recall using the word "guarantee" to 
these people in any of your conversations, is that correct? 
A. No. 
Q. Would you have used that term to a purchaser? 
A. Well, I really didn't have any authority to do so, 
but I could have by, I may have sometime, I can't say, Ed, I don't 
like to say that unless we have it in writing it doesn 1 t really 
mean anything to me, but I--
Page 88, lines 13-18 
Q. Do I understand correct then that it would not be 
either within your authority or within your training and back-
ground to make anybody a guarantee that you would make a loan in 
the future.? 
A. No. I only think we did that with our better 
bu il de111 s . 
In contrast to the statements quoted above, there is 
some testimoy of Mr. Boulton whi.ch does not support that of appella1 
However, these statements are inconclusive when standing alone. 
Moreover, when viewed together with the rest of his testimony , 
and with the testimony of appellants, these statements are equivoca: 
and inconsistent as well as inconclusive. 
The only thing that i.s certain about Mr.. Boulton 1 s 
testimony is that he cannot remember whether he used the word 
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"guarantee" in the contract negotiations with appellants. This 
however, is not the same thing as saying that he did not make 
a guarantee. An example of this legal principal is found in 
McClellan v. David, 84 Nev. 283, 439 P 2d 673 (1968). There the 
trial court granted the defendant's motion to set aside a default 
judgment. On appeal, the Supreme Court pointed out that one 
witness, Mrs. Troxel, clearly recalled three critical conversations 
while the defendant, David, stated that he did not recall the 
same conversations. In re~ersing the order to set aside the 
default the Supreme Court noted the effect of David's testimony 
when viewed in light of Mrs. Troxel's testimony: 
Her testimony was not impeached in the slightest. 
David did not deny these conversations. He simply 
said he did not recall them. Accordingly, there is 
not fundamental conflict in this testimony requiring 
us to adhere to the trial court's finding.in favor 
of respondent on this issues ... T~sttimony of a 
witness that he ·does not .·remember ·whether a ·certain 
event took ·21ace.does.rtot.coritradict.positive.testi-
. morty that ·such ·event ·or ·conversatio~took_..Elace. 
439 P Zd 67~ 677. (emphasis added). 
Thus, Mr. Boulton's testimony as to the contract negotia-
tions and the terms agreed upon does not contradict appellants 
assertion that Vantage did guarantee construction loans to them~ 
In addition to the absence of contradictory statements, Mr .. Beul ton• s 
testimony corroborates appellant!s testimony in some instances~ 
In reference to guarantees, Mr. Boulton stated on Page 78 
that Vantage 11use to of course offer this to builders.lf Mr .. Boulton 
also testified on page 88 that Vantage was in the practice of 
making guarantees of construction financing to some builders whom 
they considered to be their "better builders .. tl 
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It is well settled that the testimony of a witness, 
whether that witness is interested or disinterested, cannot be 
arbitrarily disregarded. Guinand v. Walton, 25 Utah 2d 253, 
480 P 2d 137 (1971); Corl!=Y v. Corley, 92 N.M. 716, 594 P 2d 
1172 (1979). In addition, rejection of the testimony of interestec 
witnesses which is corroborated by a disinterested witness amounts 
to arbitrary action. Ft. Mohave ·Farms, Inc. v. Dunlap, 393 P 2d 
662, 96 Ariz. 193 (1964). 
Appellants maintain that before the trial court could 
find that no guarantee was made, it had to completely reject the 
testimony of appellants, which testimony is credible and uncontra-
dicted by any other witness. There is also some evidence, provided 
by the only other party to the contract negotiations which corro-
borates appellants assertions. ·Appellants, therefore, submit that 
the great weight of the ev£dence (much more than a mere prepon-
derance) establishes that Vantage represented to appellants 
that should they purchase the bui~ding lots from Vantage, con-
struction financing for those lots was guaranteed through Deseret 
Federal. 
The high preponderance of evidence in favor of a guarantee 
is further supported by Vantage's answer to appellants amended 
complaint. This is sue is discussed in detail under Point II in th 
bri.ef but it is important to note here that Vantage admitted, in 
its answer, that construction loans were guaranteed to appellants. 
(See Amended Complaint paragraphs 3 and 4, and see defendant's 
answer, paragraph one) Vantage never did amend its corrplaint and 
therefore, this admission remains as a judicial admission.. It has 
/ Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
been held that admissions of fact in a pleading are normally 
conclusive on the party making the admission. Yates v. Large, 
284 Or. 217, 585 P 2d 697 (1978); McCormickonEvidence 630, Section 
262 (2d ed. 1972). During closing arguments, counsel for Vantage 
indicated that it was an error on his part to admit in his 
answer, that Vantage guaranteed the construction loans. However, 
even if Vantage had amended its answer, the previous admission 
can still be used as evidence to establish appellant's case. 
Yates ·v .. Large., supra. This admission, coupled with the abundant 
testimony that Vantage did make a guarantee of construction 
financing to appellants constitutes a very high species. of evidence. 
American..;First Title v. First Federal, 415 P 2d 930 (Okl. 1966) 
The trial Court's finding that appellants failed to esta-
blish an enforceable agreement to provide construction financing 
goes against the great weight of thE~ evidence: and constitutes a 
reversable error. As discussed infra, a finding that Vantage 
made a guarantee to appellants, irrespective of the enforceability 
of that guarantee would compel a rescission of the sales contracts 
for the FOUR {4) lots sued upon. 
Appellants provided substantial evidence that Vantage 
did make statements to them which amounted to a guarantee of 
construction financing. In contrast, Vantage provided no evidence 
that such statements were not made. In the language of the Supreme 
Court of Utah., the evidence so 11 clearly preponderates" against the 
trial Court 1 s finding that such a firlding amounts to a manifest 
injustice. Hatch v. ·Bastian, supra, 'rhe evidence concerning the 
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guarantee of construction financing is of sufficient quality 
and substance that all reasonable minds would conclude that 
Vantage, through Doug Boulton did make the statements constitu-
ting a guarantee of contruction financing. When evidence that a 
particular -fact exists is of this quality and substance, thE! trial 
court is compelled to make a finding that said fact does exist. 
De Vas v. Noble~ 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P 2d 290 (1962). 
In view of the foregoing, the trial court's holding that 
appellants had to establish an enforceable agreement of Vantage to 
provide construction financing and its finding that appellants 
did not establish this enforceable agreement, constitutes a 
reversable error. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL. COURT ERRED .·IN .·FINDING .THAT. VANTAGE DID 
NOT GUARANTEE ·coNSTRUCTTON .-FINANCING WHEN VANTAGE 
ADMITTED. THE . GUARANTEE TN ·rTS. ANSWER .·AND NO AMEND-
MENT TO THE 'ANSWER.WAS.MADE AT ANY TIME. 
Paragraph three of appellants amended complaint alleges 
that appellants agreed to purchase certain building lots frcm 
Vantage~ Paragraph three also alleges that this agreement was 
"condi.tioned upon VANTAGE CORPORATION'S guarantee of a construc-
tion loan through DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN for each of 
sai.d lots." (See amended complaint paragraph three). 
Paragraph four of appellants amended complaint also 
alleges that the "down payment, interest payments, and purchase 
were conditioned upon VANTAGE CORPORATION'S guarantee of con-
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Vantage answered the allegations contained in paragraph 
1, 2, 3, and 4 of appellants amended complaint as follows: 
"Defendant admits the allegations of para-
graph 1, 2, 3, and 4 of plaintiffs' complaint." 
(defendant's answer, paragraph one) 
Without question, Vantage has admitted that construction 
financing was guaranteed to appellants. Vantage did not amend 
its answer at any time during pre-trial procedures or during trial. 
A factual admission in a pleading filed with the Court is 
a judicial admission. The weight to be given such admissions 
varies between jurisdictions but they are: always given significant 
weight. Irt Yates v. Large, 284 Or. 217, 585 P 2d 697 (1978), 
the Supreme Court of Oregon explained the conclusive naturE-: of 
judicial admissions as follows: 
An admi.ssion of fact in a pleading is a judi-
cial admission and, as such, is normally conclusive 
on the party making such an admission. 
The Supreme Court of Arizona has also held that when a 
fact is alleged in the complaint, and then admitted in the answer, 
this admission binds the defendant and is conclusive as to the 
admitted fact.. Paul Schoonover, Inc. v. Ram Construction, ·rnc., 
129 Ariz. 204, 630 P 2d 27 {1981)~ 
During closing arguments~ Vantage's admission that the 
agreement between the parties was conditioned upon a guarantee 
of construction financing was pointed out to the Court by counsel 
for appellants {Tr .. 2d pp. 2, .3, 12). Specifically, counsel read 
the pertinent portiDns of the amended complaint and answer. This 
however~ did not elicit a response frcm counsel for Vantage. On 
rebuttal argument, counsel for appellants again brought attention 
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to Vantage's admission and asserted: " in regards to this, 
the guarantee, first of all it's admitted in the pleadings, and 
I believe it's not in issue because of that." (Tr. 2d p. 12). 
After this second reference to the admission by Vantage that 
guarantees of construction financing were made counsel for 
Vantage did respond: 
Mr. Garrett: Your Honor, I just have one thing 
... I certainly didn't intend in the pleadings to 
admit any such guarantee. If I did, it was an 
error on my part, and ask to re-do the pleadings 
on that reason, (Tr. 2d. p. 14). 
This statement may amount to a motion to amend but 
the Court did not respond to this statement and the pleadings 
were not amended. 
Even if Vantage had amended its answer to exclude the 
admission of guaranteed construction loans, such alill amendment 
would no~t eliminate the evidentiary effect of the prior admission. 
Upon filing of an amended answer, however, 
any admission of fact in the superseded answer 
is no longer a judicial admission, but is admiss-
ible as evidence to establish plaintiff's case. 
. . . In other words a superseded pleading can 
be used as an "evidentiary admission," but is no< 
longer conclusive upon.the party making such an 
admission. r • 'Yates ·v .· Large, 585 P 2d 697, 700. 
Thus., until the admission is removed through an amendment, 
it will remain as a judicial admission and is conclusive on Van-
tage., The Trial Court's finding that Vantage did not make the 
guarantee of construction financing is in direct conflict with the 
Vantage's admission~ The Court's finding is also in direct 
conflict with the great weight of the evidence. The erroneous 
nature of the Court 1 s finding constitutes a reversible error and 
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compels a reversal. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED .·IN. REQUIRING APPELLANTS TO 
PROVE ALL THE 'ELEMENTS.OF FRAUD BY CLEAR AND CON-
VINCING PROOF ON APPELLANT'S CLAIM.OF MISREPRESENTATION. 
In Utah, and in may other jurisdictions, a contract, 
including a contract for the sale of land, is subject to rescission 
where there has been a material misrepresentation which induced 
the contract. Under this doctrine, proof of all the essential 
elements of actionable fraud is not necessary. The only elements 
which must be established are a misrepresentation as to a material 
aspect of the agreement which is relied upon by the plaintiff. A 
review of the case law whi.ch supports this doctrine and the applica-
tion of the doctrine to the abundant evidence of a guarantee 
(supra) will clearly establish that appellants are entitled to 
rescission and restitution. 
The case which gives the clearest statement of this doc-
trine is Lehnhardt v. City of Phoertix, 105 Ariz. 142, 460 P 2d 637 
(1969).. There, a -,property owner within the City of Phoenix received 
by mail a quit claim deed and a sketch prepared by the City. These 
documents were accompanied by a letter requesting the land owner 
to dedicate a portion of her property to the city for roadway 
purposes. The quit claim deed was accurate but the sketch, 
which was intended to illustrate that portion of the property 
which would be dedi.cated, was erroneous. The quit claim deed 
actually conveyed 4,131 square feet more than the sketch indicated. 
The City was una~are that the sketch did not correspond to the deed 
and did not intend to deceive the land owner .. 
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Several months later the landowner discovered the actual 
amount of property she had dedicated to the City. Alleging 
misrepresentation, she brought an action to rescind the transactio1 
and cancel the deed. The City of Phoenix prevailed at trial but 
the Supreme Court of Arizona reversed and remanded with instructiot 
to enter judgment in favor of the landowner. The Court stated the 
basis for recovery as follows~ 
Plaintiff contends that a transaction induced 
by the material though innocent misrepresentation 
of a party is voidable against that party. We agree 
It appears to be well-e~tablished law that 
a cl~im for rescission, as oppsed to a claim for 
damages, may be granted when "innocent" as well as 
fraudulent misrepresentations are made, and that 
accordingly, proof of each of the nine elements of 
actionable fraud is not essential in a rescission 
action . . . Conceding the absence of fraud, plain-
tiff is nevertheless entitled to rescission because 
of the representation of the city, its falsity, its 
materiality, and the fact that it was the inducing 
cause for her execution of the quit claim deed. 
In support of this doctrine the Court cited cases from 
Oregon., New Mexico and Oklahoma. 
Watkins v. Grady, 438 P 2d 491 (Ikl. 1968) and Souza v. 
Jackson, 472 P 2d 272 !Or& 1970) provide further examples of the 
application of this doctrine. In Watkins, a land owner agreed to 
grant an easement to a water distri_ct for the purpose of construc-
ting a flood control dam. The water district however, misrepre· 
sented to the land owner the actual conditions which would exist 
upon completion of the dam. Although the misrepresentation was 
"innocent", the court held in favor of the landowner and cancelled 
the easement. The Court stated: 
"Misrepresentation of material facts, although 
innocently made, if acted on by the otiher party to 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to his detriment, will constitute a sufficient 
ground for rescission and cancellation in equity." 
In Souza v. Jackson, supra, the purchaser of a home and 
surrounding property brought an action for rescission based on 
misrepresentation. The vendor represented to the purchaser that 
a well on the property produced sufficient water to supply house-
hold needs. This representation however, was erroneous since the 
well produced almost no water. The Court held for the vendor but 
the Supreme Court of Oregon reversed with directions to enter a 
decree granting rescission.. The Court stated: 
The tt.ial court found that the representation 
that the well produced three gallons per minute 
was innocently made. However, the rule is firmly 
established that a material misrepresentation 
although innocently made may be grounds for rescission. 
Robirtson v. Katz, 94 N.M. 134, 610 P 2d 201 (1980) and 
Gardner v .. Meiling,, 280 Or .. 665., 572 P 2d 1012 (1977) apply this 
same doctrine to grant rescission of land contractso 
The doctrine pronounced in ·Lehnhardt v. City ·of Phoertix, 
supra, and in the other cases cited above is also applicable in 
Utah. Although not stated in express terms, this Court appli~d the 
same rule i.rt Smith -v; Pearniain, 548 P 2d 1269 (Utah 1976).. There 
the plaintiff purchased a ~uilding which was being used as a duplex. 
Although the real estate: agent represented to the plaintiff that 
this use of the property was authorized, it was discovered, after 
the sale., that this use violated the local zoning ordinances. 
As to the nature of the misrepresentation, the evidence 
demonstrated that the real estate agent believed the use was 
authorized and that he did not indulge in bad faith~ However, 
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because of the misrepresentation the plaintiff elected to rescind 
the sale contract. The trial court entered judgment in favor of 
plaintiff and defendant appealed. 
On appeal, defendant argued that the facts did not esta-
blish the grounds necessary for rescission. Defendant argued that 
the quality of proof required is the same proof required to esta-
blish actionable fraud. The Supreme Court disagreed. 
Appellant's counsel urges that the facts here 
are insufficient to satisfy the necessary grounds 
for rescission, and the quality of proof interdicted 
in Pace v. Parrish, {to which we refer without 
necessity to repeat its language here), with which 
urgence we are compelled to disagree. 
As the Court is well aware, Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 
247 P 2d 273 (1952), is frequently cited to explain all of the 
elements of fraud. In addition to the essential elements of 
actionable fraud, Pace v .. Parrish, supra, sets forth the standard 
of proof which must be met in·order to establish fraud. In 
Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P 2d 873 (Utah, 1978) this Court cited 
Pace v .. Parrish, supra, for the proposition that fraud must be 
proved by "clear and convincing evidence". This is the "Quality 
of Proof" referred to in Smith v. Pearmain, supra, which was 
rejected as the quality of proof required to rescind a contract 
based on a material misrepresentation. 
In the case at bar, appellants provided substantial 
evidence that statements were made to them by Vantage that con-
struction financing was guaranteed since they purchased the lots 
from Vantage. No evidence was presented at trial which directly 
conflicts with thi.s evidence. Appellants also testified that they 
relied upon these statements {Tr. p. 60) and that without such 
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representation, they would not have entered the sales contracts 
(Tr. p. 65). Whether or not the guarantee was an enforceable 
agreement is entirely irrelevant. 
The representation that construction loans were guaran-
teed, coupled with appellants reliance thereon constitute grounds 
for recission and restitution~ Appellants were not required to 
prove all of the elements of fraud nor prove misrepresentation by 
clear and convincing evidence .. 
Although the trial court did not expressly rule on 
appellants claim of misrepresentation, it is apparent that the 
Court required proof of all the elements of fraud by clear and 
convincing proof {Tr. p. 123). It is also apparent that the 
distinction between appellants allegation of fraud and their claim of 
misrepresentation was made to the trial court (Tr. p ~ 5 and Tr. 
2nd p. 4). With regards to this aspect of appellant's case, 
it is in direct opposition to the legal stance adopted by the 
Court in Smith v. Pearmain_, supra, to require proof of the elements 
of fraud by clear and convincing proof. The trial court erred 
in holding appellants to thi.s quantity and quality of proof. 
This error alone requires a reversal. 
POINT IV.. THE. TRIAL. COURT ERRED .TN -"FINDING TI:IERE WAS ·suFFI-
CIENT "AND .·-PROPER _··PART' 'PERFORMANCE, . WRITINGS ,- AND. 
TESTIMONY 'TO REMOVE THE'- -oRAL ".AGREEMENT FROM 'THE 
STATUTE OF 'FRAUDS. 
Appellants alleged in their amended complaint, and Van-
tage admitted in its answer thereto, {See amended complaint para ... 
graph 3, and defendant 1 s answer, paragraph 1) that 'ttthe agreement 
between appellants and Vantage was made orally. Both appellants 
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testified at trial that no written contracts of sale or any other 
written memoranda which might have reduced the oral agreement to 
writing were ever signed by either appellant (Tr. pp. 23. 15, 17, 
73). Also, no written document, signed or unsigned, containing 
the terms of the agreement was produced at trial. Without questio'. 
an oral agreement to convey land is unenforceable under the Utah 
Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
Amended. However, at the close of all the evidence and closing 
statements, the trial court stated: "I have some doubt that--::::t:he 
statute of frauds under the circumstances of this case is appli---
cable at all~ But if it is, then I think that the part-performance 
did take it out of the statute."· {Tr. p. 123). Thj_s statement 
was transcribed into the Court's finding of fact number 13, which 
states: 
There was suffici.ent evi.dence before the Court 
of payment of the down payment on the purchase price, 
whi.ch was in the form of a writing, and a letter signed 
by one of the plainti_ffs at the time interest was paid 
and the actual payment of interest and the full pay-
ment of the principal and interest on three of the 
lots to show that the statute of frauds did not apply 
and that further testimony concerning the terms of 
sale was accepted by the court as proper. 
Appellants maintain that the courts oral statement and 
its finding of fact number 13 are erroneous~ A brief review of 
the statute of frauds and the doctrine of part performance esta-
blish that the facts and circumstances of this case do not bring 
the oral agreement between appellants and Vantage out of the Utah 
Statute of Frauds~ 
A. Stattite of Frauds 
The statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-1, Utah Code Annotated 
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(1953) requires every agreement to convey land to be in writing. 
Such an agreement is not always void or voidable but "can properly 
be described as unenforceable . . . inasmuch as the ordinary legal 
remedies are unavailable." 2 Corbin on Contracts 279, pp. 20-21 
(1950). 
At trial, the only written documents relating to the 
agreement to purchase the building lots which were introduced 
into evidence were the checks for the down payment and interest, 
Vantage's accounting of those payments and a letter from one 
appellant to Vantage.(Tr. pp. 29, 66, 99, 102). There was some 
testimony as to an earnest money agreement but most 0f this 
testimony was stricken {Tr~ pp. 110, 121, 122). 
In order to remove the agreement from the Statute of 
Frauds these writings must contain certain provisions.. It is a 
well established principal of law that written memoranda, which 
are relied upon to satisfy the Statute of Frauds must contain all 
of the essential terms and provisions of the contract.. Birdzell v. 
Utah Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412, 242 P 2d 578 (1952); Baugh 
v. Logan City~ 27 Utah 2d 291, 495 P 2d 814 (1972); Ziort's Pro-
perties, Inc., v. Holt, 538 P 2d 1319 (1975). This basic state= 
ment has been qualified to some extent in Guin.and v. Walton, 
27 Utah 2d 196, 450 P 2d 467 {1969), appeal after remand 25 Utah 
2d 253, 480 P 2d 137 fl971).. There thi_s comnt held that a written 
instrument will bring an agreement out of the statute of frauds if 
the interest is granted or declared by the writing and if the 
writing is subscribed to by the party to be charged. 
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Under the rule stated in Birdzell v. Utah Oil, supra, 
and under the rule stated in Guinand v. Walton, supra, the written 
instruments produced at trial do not br:i.ng the oral agreement 
between appellants and Vantage out of the Statute of Frauds. 
The checks and the letter (defendant's Exhibit 5) contain signa-
- tures but none of these documents refer to the essential elements 
of a contract to convey land. The most important contractural 
element which is missing from these documents is a grant or declara· 
tion of an interest in property. Without such a grant or declara-
tion the writings cannot be sufficient to take the oral agreement 
out of the Statute of Frauds~ 
The absence of any contractural terms regarding the 
property interest conveyed, and the essential nature of such 
terms, is emphasized by the Trial Court's reference to a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract. In response to counsel's argument that there 
is no evidence of terms which would give Vantage the right to 
foreclose on the property,, the court stated: 
THE COURT: Well, that 1 s true, but uniform real estate 
contracts have this provision in them that they maybe foreclosed 
as a mortgage (Tr. 2d p. 6). 
MR HARDING: But there is no evidence of any uniform 
real estate contract. 
THE COURT: That is true. But I think, inherently, I 
think the Court has inherent equitable powers in this kind of a 
case if it wanted to order a foreclosure (Tr. 2d pp. 6-7). 
Thus,, the Court felt compelled to determine the property 
interests held by each party by referring to a standard uniform 
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real estate contract. 
B. Part Performance 
When partial performance is relied upon to avoid the 
Statute of Frauds, the nature of that performance must be closely 
scrutinized. This close review of the acts asserted as part 
performance is applied with great care and is used only to prevent 
the Statute of Frauds from being used to perpetrate a Fraud. 
Ravorina v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P 2d 570 (1953). 
Finding number 13 indicates. that the performance which 
supposedly removed the agreement from the effects of the statute of 
Frauds consists of 1) partial payment of the purchase price, and 
2) actual payment of the full interest and purchase price on three 
of the lots. Vantage however, cannot rely upon either one of 
these instances of part performance. 
First, appel1ants have not attempted to rescind the 
sales contracts covering the three lots which were sl.old to third 
parties. When full payment for these lots was received, Vantage 
performed its obligation urider those contracts. Since Vantage 
did not apply the proceeds of the sales (of the three lots) pro-
portionately against the unpaid ba1ance for all seven lots, they 
cannot now claim that ·Jtthe original agreement contained only one 
contract. Thus, fu11 performance, by both parties, of the con-
tracts for lots 28, 49 and 58., does not constitute partial perfor-
mance of the sales contracts covering lots 18, 19, 34 and 35. 
Second., as to the contracts for lots 18, 19, 34 and 35, 
Vantage has done nothing which constitutes partial performanceo 
When one party seeks to remove an oral contract from the Statute 
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of Frauds, that party may rely only upon its own part performance 
and not upon the partial performance of others. This principle 
of law arises from the basic purpose of the doctrine of part per-
formance. In Schwedes v. Romain, 587 P 2d 388 (Mont. 1978), the 
Supreme Court of Montana cited 73 Am. Jur. 2d P 38, to explain this 
legal principle. 
Since the basis of the doctrine of part performance 
is to prevent a fraud upon the plaintiffs, it is true 
as a general proposition, that if a party who resists 
the enforcement of a contract chooses not to stand on 
what he has done under and in pursuance of it, the 
other party cannot be aided by it. 
This same principle has been followed by the Supreme Court 
of Utah in Utah Mercur Gold Mirt; Co. v. Herschel Gold Min. ~' 
103 Utah 249, 134 P 2d 1094 (1934). There, citing Besse v. McHenry, 
89 Mont. 520, 300 P 199 (1931), the Court stated: 
Part performance which will avoid the statute 
of frauds may consist of any act which puts 
party performing in such a position that non-
performance by other would constitute fraud. 
Thus, where one party has not done anything which can be 
construed as partial performance of an oral contract to convey 
land, it cannot rely upon the doctrine of part performance to 
avoid the statute of frauds. 
Third, even if Vantage could rely on it, mere payment 
of a portion of the purchase price is not an act of part performance 
which will remove an oral contract from the Statute of Frauds. 
Pugh v .. Gilbreath, 571 P 2d 1241 _(Okl. App. 1977); Del Rio Land, 
Inc .. v. Havmont, 118 Ariz 1, 574 P 2d 469 (1977); 73 Am. Jur. 2d 
66, Statute of Frauds, Section 436. 
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As early as 1890 the Supreme Court of Utah recognized 
this precise rule in Maxfield v. ·west, 6 Utah 327, 23 P 754 (1890). 
There the court stated, 0 the fact that a part of the purchase 
money had been paid was not of itself sufficient in equity to take 
the parol contract out of the statutes." 
The reason for this rule is that ordinarily, the relief 
obtained through the doctrine of part performance is specific 
performance of the contract. This remedy is not necessary where 
only money has changed hands since the equity court can easily 
restore the status quo by ordering the vendor to return the 
money. Pugh v. 'Gilbreath, supra. 
In Holmgren v. Ballard, 534 P 2d 611 (Utah 1975) the 
Supreme Court of Utah outlined four types of acts, all of which 
should be considered to determine whether sufficient part perfor-
mance has been accomplished. One of the four acts in payment 
of a valuable consi.deration. 
Similar to Holmgren. v .: ·Ballard,, supra, is Powers v. 
Hastings_, 93 Wash. 2d 709, 612 P 2d 371 (1980). There the court 
explained that part performance has three elements; 1) possession, 
2) payments and 3) improvements.. If the plaintiff has taken 
possession of land under an oral contract., has made payments and 
has made substantial improvements on the land, he is enti.tled 
to the benefit of the doctrine of part performance. The Court 
held that sufficient part performance can be established where 
two of the elements exist .. 
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In sum the oral statement by the trial court (Tr. p. 123) 
and firlding number 13 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law are erroneous as a matter of law for FOUR basic reasons. 1) thE 
Statute of Frauds does apply to this oral agreement; 2) the writin~ 
offered at trial are insuffici_ent to remove the agreement from the 
Statute of Frauds; 3) Vantage cannot rely on the part performance 
of appellants and, even if they could, part payment alone is in-
sufficient to remove an Agreement from the Statute of Frauds; and 
4) Full performance of three of the sales contracts does not con-
stitute partial performance on the remaining four. 
The erroneous conclusions of the trial court described 
above require a reversal of the Trial Court's holding. Appellants 
elected to rescind, they gave proper notice of rescission, and 
when Vantage refused to return appellants' money, they brought 
this action .. 
POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT 'ERRED-IN.REFUSING_TQ_FIND THAT 
'VANTAGE HAS BEEN 'UNJUSTLY.ENRICHED AS A.RESULT OF 
'THE 'TRANSACTIONS 'GIVING 'RISE TO 'THIS LAW SUIT. 
A cause of action for unjust enrichment arises whenever 
money or property has been placed in one person's possession under 
circumstances that in equity and good conscience, he ought not to 
retain. 'Heaton ·v .. Imus,, 9.3 Wash. 2d 249, 608 P 2d 631 (1980). 
Stated another way, by the Supreme Court of Utah> unjust enrichment 
occurs whenever a person has and r.etains money or benefits which int 
justice and equity belong to another. L'& A Drywall v. Whitmore, 
608 P 2d 626 (Utah 1980). 
Whether viewed in light of the Utah rule or in light of 
the Washington rule, the circumstances of the present case give 
rise to a cause of action based on unjust ----..: _.,_ ____ ...._ 
/ Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Here, the appellant's paid a down payment and interest 
payments to Vantage. According to the agreement between the par-
ties these payments were applied to the purchase of SEVEN (7) 
building lots owned by Vantage. However, in exchange for these 
payments.:~efr:ants received nothing from Vantage. No deeds, trust 
deeds or trust deed notes were signed by appellants or Vantage 
and thus, no interest in the property passed to appellants. At 
this time, Vantage still holds title to the property and has 
retained appellants down payment and interest payments, but has 
not performed its obligations under the original agreement. On 
the other hand, appellants have substantially performed their 
contractural obligations, suffered a loss in doing so, and, as a 
result of Trial Court's holding, are precluded from recovering 
that loss. 
The inequiti.es in this case are blatant. Vantage has 
retained money which in justice and equity belongs to appellants. 
Vantage has therefore been unjustly enriched at the expense of 
appellants and should, in equity and good conscience, be required 
to return the· down payment and interest to appellants. 
POINT VI. THE TRIAL. COURT. 'ERRED TN .'REFUSING. TO . FIND THAT 
VANTAGE. BREACHE'D .·THE ·sALES CONTRACTS ON .THE FOUR 
LOTS SUED 'UPON BY APPELLANTS. 
As demonstrated supra, the great weight of the evidence 
at trial establishes that v·antage did in fact guarantee construc-
tion financing to appellants. Therefore, if the agreement to pur-
chase the SEVEN (7) building lots created binding, enforceable sales 
contracts, the terms of those contracts must include the guarantee 
of construction financing. 
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Appellants testified that the guarantee of construction 
loans was an important factor which induced them to enter the 
agreement. (Tr. p. 65). Therefore, the refusal of Deseret Federal 
to provide appellants with construction loans for the lots con-
stituted a material and fundamental breach of the sales contracts. 
A review of the case law establishes that appellants are entitled 
to rescission and restitution as a result of Vantage's breach. 
It is well established that a material breach which 
destroys or vitiates the entire purpose for entering into the 
contract gives rise to a right to rescind th~ contract. Cady v. 
Slingerland~ 514 P 2d 114 7 (Wyo. 19 73) ; ·polyglycoat v. Holcomb, 
591 P 2d 449 (Utah 1979) ;· Abrams v. Firtartcial, 13 Utah 2d 343, 3 74 
P 2d 309 (1962). A good ·example oL_this_ is found in Lane v. Bis-
ceglia, 15 Ariz. App. 269, 488 P 2d 474 (1971). There the 
appellants agreed to purchase certain real property from the 
appellees. As part of the consideration, appellants agreed to 
assume an existing 6% mortgage on the property. The appellants 
placed $5,000.00 in escrow as earnest money and the appellees pre-
pared the necessary instruments. However, the existing mortgage 
allowed the mortgagee to increase the interest rate upon assumption. 
When the appellants were informed of the mortgagee's intent to 
raise the rate to 6 3]4% they refused to complete the transaction. 
Thereafter,, a law suit was brought by appellants "to rescind the 
contract and restore the parties to the stat.ms quo ante, i.e .. , 
return the $5~000~00 to the purchasers." 
Although the higher interest rate would result in an 
increase of only $3.00 per month, the Court determined that by 
'"'I /, 
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requiring the purchaser to assume the higher rate, the seller 
materially breached the contract. This breach gave the pur-
chaser the right to rescind the contract and recover their 
earnest money. The Court further stated that the motive of a 
purchaser in rescinding the contract is immaterial where there 
has been a material breach. 
The Arizona Court's holding in Lane v. Bisceglia, supra, 
is consistent with the present Utah Supreme Court holding in 
Polyglycoat v. Holcomb, 591 P 2 449 (Utah 1979). Although this 
case did not involve a contract for the sale of real property, 
this Court clearly stated the rule of law which is directly 
applicable and controlling in the case at bar. 
As a general proposition, a party to a contract 
has a right of rescission and an action for restitu-
tion as an alternative to an action for damages 
where there has been a material breach of the con-
tract by the other party. What constitutes so 
serious a breach as to justify rescission is not 
easily reduced to precise statement, but certainly 
a failure of performance which "defeats the very 
object of the contract" or "is of such prime im-
portance that the contract would not have been 
made if default in that particular had been contem-
plated" is a material failure. Polyglycoat v. 
Holcomb, 591 P 2d 449, 451. 
Appellants testified that they purchased the lots for 
the purpose of building homes ttthereon (Tr. p .. 13). Appellants 
knew that the construction of homes would require financing and 
they agreed to purchase the lots only upon a guarantee that 
construction financir1g would be provided.. This guarantee was a 
material provision of the original agreement. Therefore, when 
appellants were not even permitted to apply for construction f inan-
cing at Deseret Federal, Vantage failed to perform a material 
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obligation under the agreement. This failure to perform defeated 
"the very object of the contract" and compels a reversal of the 
Trial Court's holding. 
CONCLUSIONS 
For the reasons stated above, appellants respectfully 
request this Court to reverse the Trial Court's Judgment and 
require the Trial Court to enter judgment in favor of the plain-
tiffs and against the defendants in the sum of $9,371.80 plus 
costs of Court and interest at the legal rate. 
Respectfully submitted. 
Utah 84062 
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